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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court commit reversible error in refusing 
to admit evidence of the respondent's post-accident flight under 
the facts of the instant case? 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is published at 
Fisher v. Trapp, 748 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Utah Rules of Evidence, 103, 401, 402, and 403 will 
determine the outcome of this appeal. Due to the length of these 
provisions, the text of each is set out in Appendix A of this 
brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Fisher and respondent Trapp were involved in 
an auto-pedestrian accident in Salt Lake City on June 3, 1982, at 
approximately 9:15 p.m. Fisher brought action against Trapp 
alleging that the accident was the result of Trappfs negligent 
driving. The case was tried before a jury. The jury returned a 
verdict of "no cause of action" in favor of Trapp. 
During an in-camera hearing before trial, Trapp 
acknowledged that he had failed to stop at the scene of the acci-
dent. Following the collision, Trapp continued northbound on 
Redwood Road in Salt Lake City for some distance. Trapp then 
turned around and returned to the accident site. Upon returning 
to the scene, Trapp observed an adult rendering aid and assistance 
to Fisher. 
Trapp left the scene a second time only to return again. 
Upon his return, Trapp spoke with a police officer, but did not 
immediately identify himself as the driver of the car. After 
speaking with the officer, Trapp drove home. 
Within 30 minutes of the accident, Trapp telephoned the 
police and identified himself as the driver of the car. (Record 
at 270) 
Before trial Trapp made a motion in limine to exclude 
evidence that he failed to stop at the scene of the collision. 
(Record at 271) At the hearing on the motion, Fisher denied that 
his injuries were aggravated in any way by Trappfs failure to 
stop. (Record at 272) Rather, Fisher contended that such evi-
dence was admissible to create an inference of consciousness of 
guilt. (Record at 272) The trial court granted Trapp's motion to 
exclude the evidence. The trial judge ruled that the prejudicial 
effect of the evidence outweighed any probative value the evidence 
of flight might have. (Record at 273) 
At trial, both Trapp and Patrick Fisher, appellant's 
12-year old brother, testified how the accident occurred. 
(Record at 282-286 and 309-318) Appellant was unable to testify 
since he has no conscious recollection of the accident. (Record 
at 303) The investigating officer and experts for both parties 
testified on the circumstances and cause of the accident. 
(Record at 368, 69, 392 and 427) 
The following facts surrounding the collision were 
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established without serious dispute at trial: 
1. At approximately 9:15 p.m. on June 3, 1982, Trapp 
was driving north in the east lane of Redwood Road near 400 North 
in Salt Lake City. (Record at 282) 
2. The evening was dark and the headlights on Trapp's 
vehicle were lighted on low beam. Traffic on the highway was 
heavy. (Record at 282) 
3. Just prior to the collision, Trapp's automobile was 
traveling at approximately 38 to 40 miles per hour in a 45 mile 
per hour traffic zone. (Record at 283, 298, 315 and 366) 
4. As Trapp neared 4 30 North on Redwood Road, Fisher 
and his brother Patrick were standing along the west shoulder of 
Redwood Road, waiting for traffic to clear so they could cross 
the street. (Record at 309-310) 
5. As Fisher darted across the west lane of Redwood 
Road, his brother saw the Trapp vehicle and yelled to Fisher. 
(Record at 310, 315) 
6. Fisher was nine years old at the time of his acci-
dent with Trapp. (Record at 303) 
7. There was no crosswalk at the point where Fisher 
attempted to cross Redwood Road. (Record at 306, 367) 
8. Fisher collided with the left front fender of.the 
Trapp vehicle and fell backwards or "kind of sideways", landing 
approximately one foot from where he was standing when he struck 
the automobile. (Record at 287, 296, 310, 316-318, 345, 413-416) 
A physical examination of the Trapp automobile revealed 
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no damage to the front grill, headlights, hood, or windshield. 
The only physical evidence of the collision was a smudge of dirt 
off of the left side of the vehicle. (Record at 269) Experts 
for both parties agreed at trial that Fisher collided with the 
left side of the Trapp automobile near the front wheel area. 
(Record at 345, 348, 413-416) 
Pursuant to the trial court's order, no evidence of 
Trappfs post-collision conduct was introduced at trial. The trial 
jury returned a verdict in favor of respondent Trapp, finding no 
negligence. Appellant's motion for a new trial was denied, and 
the matter was appealed. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial 
court verdict and judgment as set forth in the opinion attached to 
appellant's brief. (Record at 242) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
There is no inconsistency in the civil and criminal law 
regarding admitting evidence of "flight" and the trial court did 
not commmit reversible error in excluding evidence of Trapp's 
post-collision conduct. There is no need for the issuance of a 
writ of certiorari. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
THERE IS NO INCONSISTENCY IN THE CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL LAW REGARDING ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF 
"FLIGHT" WHICH JUSTIFIES THE ISSUANCE OF A 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI. 
A. The Decisions in Franklin and Bales are Clearly 
Distinguishable From This Case. 
The main focus of Fisher's petition is that this court 
has held that evidence of flight is probative in State v. 
Franklin, 735 P.2d 34 (Utah 1987), and State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 
573 (Utah 1983). Fisher alleges that the Court of Appeals' 
opinion in this case creates a separate rule for civil cases with 
the appearance of inconsistency between the application of the 
criminal law and the civil law. It is therefore necessary to 
review the holdings of these cases to understand the basis for the 
same and to appreciate the scope of their applicability. 
At the outset it is important to understand the 
justification for admitting flight evidence in both criminal and 
civil cases. It has been admitted in certain cases where the 
criminal defendant has denied involvement in the crime, such as in 
Franklin and Bales, and also in civil personal injury cases 
arising out of automobile accidents where the defendant denies his 
involvement in causing the accident. 
Under the circumstances of the Franklin case where 
defendant denied his involvement in the crime, this court held that 
evidence of flight was probative and cited the Bales decision in 
support of its holding. Franklin, 735 P.2d at 39. A comparison 
of the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in this case and the 
reasoning of the Bales decision demonstrates that there is no 
inconsistency in the criminal and civil law of the State of Utah. 
The Bales case involved two defendants who were convicted 
of aggravated burglary. Witnesses had observed them under 
suspicious circumstances leaving the home of the victim and police 
were summoned. When accosted, the defendants attempted to flee 
from the police but were eventually apprehended. The evidence of 
the attempted flight was admitted with a cautionary instruction. 
The court criticized the instruction and suggested a more 
appropriate instruction should have been given. Bales, 675 P.2d 
at 575. 
In discussing the rationale for the admission of such 
evidence, the court pointed out the important policy considerations 
applicable by citing extensively from other jurisdictions. The 
court stated: 
State courts differ widely in their 
attitudes toward flight instructions. For 
example, Iowa permits an instruction that 
flight is evidence of guilt under certain 
circumstances. State v. Barr, Iowa, 259 
N.W.2d 841, 842 (1977). At the opposite 
extreme, South Carolina held a flight 
instruction to be reversible error and 
invalidated all flight instructions, no 
matter what the circumstances. State v. 
Grant, 275 S.C. 404, 407, 272 S.E.2d 169, 
171 (1980). Other states have adopted 
diversified intermediate positions. See 
generally 25 A.L.R. 886-909 (1923 & Supp. 
1983); 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial §788 (1974). 
The opinions of the federal courts have 
provided the most extensive analysis. The 
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United States Supreme Court has expressed 
reservations about evidence of flight: "We 
have consistently doubted the probative 
value in criminal trials of evidence that 
the accused fled the scene of an actual or 
supposed crime." Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471, 483 n. 10, 83 S.Ct. 407, 415 
n. 10, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). Responsive to 
that concern, the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia has viewed flight as 
twice removed from direct evidence of guilt. 
That court recommended an instruction 
explaining that flight does j]iot necessarily 
reflect guilt, that jurors m£y (but need 
not) consider flight as one circumstance 
tending to show feelings of guilt, and that 
they may (but need not) consider feelings of 
guilt as evidence tending to show actual 
guilt. Miller v. United States, 320 F.2d 
767, 773 (D.C.Cir. 1963). In a later case, 
that court stressed that flight instruction 
should be used sparingly and should be 
tempered by instructions explaining that 
many motives may prompt flight, and thus a 
jury should use caution before inferring 
guilt from the fact of flight. Austin v. 
United States, 414 F.2d 1155, 1157 (D.C.Cir. 
1969). The instruction given in this case 
would clearly be error in th^ District of 
Columbia because it creates tloo direct a 
Link between flight and guilt of the crime 
charged. Bales, 675 P.2d at 574, 575. 
Thus, it is clear that trial courts should exercise great 
caution before admitting evidence of flight. The trial court and 
the Court of Appeals each properly rejected Fisher's argument that 
the evidence should be admitted in this casle. 
B. Since Trapp Admitted His Involvement in the 
Accident, There Was No Need to Admit the Evidence of 
His Post-Accident Conduct. 
The attention of the court is directed to the recitation 
of the facts. These facts have been set forth in some detail to 
demonstrate why the trial court and the Court of Appeals agreed 
with Trapp that there was no need to introduce evidence of his 
post-accident conduct. Trapp does not deny that he was the driver 
of the car involved in the accident. It is also important to 
understand that Fisher's older brother witnessed the accident and 
there was nothing about his testimony that suggested any real 
conflict in the evidence. Thus, the probative value of 
introducing the evidence was minimal and was far outweighed by the 
possible prejudicial effect as set forth below. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF TRAPP'S POST-COLLISION 
CONDUCT. 
A. The Determination of Evidentiary Matters is Properly 
Left to the Sound Discretion of the Trial Court. 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence grants trial 
courts considerable discretion in determining whether evidence, 
although relevant, should be excluded on grounds of prejudice, 
confusion, or waste of time. This court in Terry v. Zions Co-op 
Merchantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), reaffirmed the 
generally recognized principle that a reviewing court should 
generally defer to the trial court's determination of evidentiary 
matters. 
In Terry, the plaintiff customer brought a malicious pro-
secution, false arrest and false imprisonment action against the 
defendant merchant arising from an alleged shoplifting incident. 
At trial, the defendant wished to introduce evidence of the plain-
tiff's prior conviction and its surrounding facts as affecting the 
issue of damages. The trial court excluded the introduction of 
the evidence, finding that the proffered evidence would have 
misled and prejudiced the jury. 
In holding that the trial judge committed no error in 
balancing the probative value of the evidehce against its prejudi-
cial effect, the court stated, "When the trial judge weighs the 
matter and makes the determination, his ruling should be looked 
upon with indulgence and not disturbed unless it clearly appears 
that he abused his discretion." Id. at 323 (emphasis added). 
The broad discretion granted to tibial courts under the 
Utah Rules of Evidence to determine the relevancy, materiality, or 
prejudicial nature of evidence is shown in Reiser v. Lohner, 641 
P.2d 93 (Utah 1982) . 
In Reiser, the plaintiff sought recovery for personal 
injuries sustained as a result of the defendant doctor's alleged 
negligent medical treatment. The defendant doctor had failed to 
perform two medical tests on the plaintiff'|s mother while plain-
tiff was j_n utero. Plaintiff was born with severe brain damage 
and was later diagnosed as suffering from c|erebral palsy and 
spastic quadraplegia, all of which was indisputably not caused by 
the defendant's failure to adminster the tw|o medical procedures on 
plaintiff's mother. Prior to trial, defendant made a motion in 
limine to exclude evidence that the medical procedures had not 
been taken until just prior to the plaintiff's birth. The trial 
court granted the motion. 
On appeal, this court refused to reverse the trial 
court's evidentiary ruling, stating: 
The trial judge was within the bounds of his 
authority when he excluded the tests (or 
lack of) pertaining to Rh sensitivity. It 
is undisputed that Rh sensitivity was not 
the cause of the child's injury, and any 
evidence as to the diagnosis of such sen-
sitivity therefore appears to be without 
relevance. When this is coupled with the 
potential prejudicial effect such evidence 
might have upon the jury, the trial judge 
was well within his discretion to exclude 
tt. Reiser, 641 P.2d at 97 (emphasis added) 
In view of the clear statements of this court in Terry and 
Reiser, and the underlying principle of Rule 403 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence, the balancing of probative value against prejudicial 
effect must necessarily rest within the sound discretion of the 
trial court. Since this court has heretofore granted broad 
discretion to the trial courts of this state in making evidentiary 
rulings, the trial judge's exclusion of evidence of Trapp's post-
collision conduct should not be disturbed absent evidence of clear 
abuse of discretion or manifest error. 
B. The Prejudicial Effect of Evidence of Trapp's 
Post-Collision Conduct Substantially Outweighs 
the Probative Value of Such Evidence in the Instant 
Action. 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence sets forth the 
applicable standard for the exclusion of relevant evidence on the 
grounds of prejudice: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
If its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
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waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
This court in Terry v. Zions Co-op Mercantile Institution, 
605 P.2d at 323, n. 31, stated: 
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial . . . 
if it has the tendency to influence the out-
come of the trial by impropet means, or if 
tt appeals to the jury's sympathies, or 
arouses its sense of horror, provokes its 
instincts to punish or otherwise causes a 
jury to base its decision on something other 
than the established proposition of the 
case. (quoting Lease America Corp. v. 
Insurance Co. of North America, 88 wis.2d 
395, 276 N.W.2d 767, 770 (1979) ) . 
The trial court in the instant ca^e noted that evidence 
of flight may be relevant under certain circumstances. (Record at 
272) However, the court held that under ti\e facts of this case, 
the limited probative value of evidence of Trapp's post-collision 
conduct was outweighed by the tendency of \\he evidence to "inflame 
the jury." (Record at 272-273) The tendency of evidence of post-
accident flight to unfairly prejudice jurieis is well recognized: 
[I]n many situations, the inference of 
consciousness of guilt of the| particular 
crime is so uncertain and ambiguous and the 
evidence so prejudicial that one is forced 
to wonder whether the evidence is not 
directed to punishing the "wicked" generally 
rather than resolving the issue of guilt of 
the offense charged. 
* * * 
In addition, the potential for preju-
dice for flight evidence should be weighed 
against is probative value. (Critical scru-
tiny is called for in each particular case. 
McCormick on Evidence §271, (lawyers 3d Ed. 
1984) (emphasis added). 
Appellant asserts that evidence of Trapp's post-collision 
conduct raises several inferences, any of which would be helpful 
to the jury in the determination of the instant action. Although 
the relevancy of a piece of evidence proffered is crucial, the 
probative value of the evidence, standing alone, does not deter-
mine its admissibility. Terry, 605 P.2d at 322. The excluded 
evidence in the instant case is, at best, only tangentially rele-
vant, due its tendancy to allow the jury to speculate on facts 
unsupported in the record. The trial court did not err in prohi-
biting such potentially prejudicial evidence. Other courts have 
likewise noted that facts which support only conjectural infer-
ences have little, if any, probative value. Since facts sup-
porting only conjectural inferences have such limited probative 
value, at least one jurisdiction has held them to be per se inad-
missible. Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 
F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1984) (applying Colorado law); and Dolan v. 
Mitchell, 179 Colo. 359, 502 P.2d 72 (1972). 
Although appellant cites several cases which hold evi-
dence of post-accident flight admissible under certain circum-
stances, other courts have held such evidence to be inadmissible. 
See Freeman v. Anderson, 279 Ark. 282, 651 S.W.2d 450 (1983); 
Spencer v. Adams, 37 Ga.Ct.App. 344, 140 S.E. 390 (1927); Clark v. 
Mask, 232 Miss. 65, 98 So.2d 467 (1957); and Barnes v. Gaines, 668 
P.2d 1175 (Okla.Ct.App. 1983). 
A trial court's ruling under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence is most often a fact intensive decision that should not be 
applied blindly to cases involving different facts and circum-
stances. Flight from the scene of a tragejdy may be quite as 
consistent with innocence as with negligence. One, who, despite 
due care, kills or injures another, may thjrough ignorance of the 
law or through panic flee from the scene op his act, and yet be 
perfectly innocent. It would be a dangerous rule which would 
permit the jury to consider flight as evidence of negligence in 
every case. See People v. Cismadija, 167 tylich. 210, 132 N.W. 489 
(1911). The equivocal nature of respondent's flight under the 
circumstances of this case should be of patticular concern to this 
court. 
The cases cited by appellant for ihe proposition that 
evidence of post-accident flight is admissible are clearly 
distinguishable on their facts. First, th0 trial of the instant 
action demonstrated that there is little, if any, dispute how the 
accident occurred. Trapp admitted that he did not see Fisher 
until the moment of impact. (Record at 285|) It was undisputed at 
trial that the point of impact was on the slide of the Trapp 
vehicle. (Record at 296, 310, 345, 369, 37)1, and 413-416) 
In Petroleum Carrier Corp. v. Snydbr, 161 F.2d 323 (5th 
Cir. 1947), cited by appellant, there were (serious disputes on 
whether the defendant was speeding prior to the moment of impact, 
whether the defendant was on the wrong side of the road, and 
whether defendant had failed to dim his lights as required by state 
law. Shaddy v. Daley, 58 Idaho 536, 76 P.2^ 3 279 (1938), is 
similarly distinguishable. In Shaddy, ther£ were a serious factual 
disputes on whether the defendant's truck h^ d its headlights 
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lighted, whether the defendant's truck struck the decedent on the 
highway, and whether the defendant was speeding at the moment of 
impact. Other cases cited by appellant involving serious factual 
disputes include Harrington v. Sharff, 305 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1962), 
and State v. Ford, 109 Conn, 490, 146 A. 828 (1929). 
Second, unlike the instant case, where eyewitnesses to 
the accident were able to testify as to how the accident occurred, 
several of the cases cited by appellant involve factual situations 
where there were no eyewitnesses to the accident. As a result, in 
those cases there was little, if any, way to determine how the 
accident occurred. In the instant case, the jury was able to hear 
testimony both from Fisherfs brother, Patrick, and from Trapp on 
how the accident occurred. 
Since the trial jury in the instant case heard direct 
testimony on the facts and circumstances of the accident, the jury 
did not need to consider the possible inferences that Fisher 
attempted to raise through the introduction of evidence of Trapp1s 
post-collision conduct. Such conjectural inferences could have 
confused the jury and distracted them from deciding the case on 
the direct testimony of the two eyewitnesses to the accident. 
Cases cited by appellant where no eyewitnesses were available to 
testify how the accident occurred include: Brooks v. E. J. Willig 
Truck Transportation Co., 40 Cal.2d 669, 455 P.2d 802 (1953); 
State v. Ford, 109 Conn. 490, 146 A. 828 (1929); Busbee v. 
Quarrier, 172 So.2d 17 (Fla.Ct.App. 1965); Waycot v. Northeast 
Ins. Co., 465 A.2d 854 (Maine 1983); Johnson v. Austin, 406 Mich. 
420, 280 N.W.2d 9 (1979); and Jones v. Str|elecki, 49 N.J. 513, 231 
A.2d 558 (1967) . 
Third, several of the cases cited by appellant are 
distinguishable from the instant case, sinfce the evidence of 
flight was admissible to impeach the credibility of defendants who 
denied involvement in the accidents giving rise to those cases. 
See Dean v. Cole, 217 F.Supp. 280 (E.D. S.fc. 1963); Greenwood v. 
Bailey, 184 So. 289 (Ala.Ct.App. 1938); Gr£ys v. Connecticut Co., 
123 Conn. 605, 198 A. 259 (1938); Busbee vh Quarrier, 172 So.2d 17 
(Fla.Ct.App. 1965); and Vuillemot v. August J. Claverie & Co., 125 
So. 168 (La. 1929). 
In the instant case, respondent Tifapp voluntarily 
telephoned the police within 30 minutes of the accident to advise 
them that he had been involved in the accident with appellant 
Fisher. Furthermore, at trial, Trapp uneqi^ivocally testified that 
he was the driver of the vehicle involved iln the accident giving 
rise to this case. Under such circumstances, evidence of Trappfs 
post-collision conduct has little, if any, probative value. 
Fourth, as several of the cases cijted by appellant 
suggest evidence of post-accident flight ma|y have probative value 
where there is an allegation that the plain|tiff is entitled to 
punitive damages as a result of the defendant's gross negligence 
or where the pLaintiff!s injuries were aggravated due to the 
defendant's failure to stop and render assistance. See Brooks v. 
E. J. Willig Truck Transportation Co., 40 C^1.2d 669, 455 P.2d 802 
(1953); Langenstein v. Reynaud, 13 La.App. £72, 127 So. 764 
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(1930); Richards v. Office Products Co., 55 Ohio App.2d 143, 380 
N.E.2d 725 (1977); and Hallman v. Cushman, 196 S.C. 402, 13 S.E.2d 
498 (1941). These cases are clearly distinguishable from the 
instant case, since Fisher's complaint against Trapp did not 
allege that the accident was due to any gross negligence on the 
part of Trapp nor does Fisher contend that his injuries were 
aggravated due to Trapp's failure to immediately stop and render 
aid at the accident scene. 
Fifth, unlike in Johnson v. Austin, 406 Mich. 420, 280 
N.W.2d 9 (1979), and Jones v. Strelecki, 49 N.J. 513, 231 A.2d 
558 (1967), cited by appellant, the instant case does not involve 
the special public policy concerns eminating from an unidentified 
motorist act. It is clear that the public policy considerations 
underlying under such acts favor compensation. Since the flight 
of the unidentified motorist may result in the plaintiff losing 
the evidence necessary to establish his claim under such an act, 
courts are more willing to allow inferences to be drawn from the 
driver's flight to allow injured parties to recover, who without 
the inference would most likely be unable to recover. The public 
policy concerns present in Johnson and Jones are not present in 
the instant case. Although some evidence has been lost due to 
Fisher's inability to testify at trial, ample evidence on how the 
accident occurred was presented at trial. 
In sum, the cases cited by Fisher demonstrate the proba-
tive value of evidence of flight under certain limited circum-
stances: 1) where there are serious fact disputes surrounding the 
accident; 2) where there are no eyewitnesses to the accident; 
3) where the defendant denies involvement fin the accident; 
4) where the plaintiff's injuries are aggravated by the flight; 
and 5) where special statutory based public policy concerns favor 
a finding of negligence. The instant action does not fall within 
any of the above-cited categories. Under the circumstances of 
this case, the prejudicial effect of admitting evidence of Trapp's 
post-collision conduct clearly outweighs t^ ie probative value of 
such evidence. 
POINT III. 
EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT ERREO IN EXCLUDING 
EVIDENCE OF TRAPP'S POST-COLLISION CONDUCT, 
SUCH ERROR WAS HARMLESS AND E|OES NOT WARRANT 
REMAND. 
Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that pre-
judicial error will not occur unless the excluded evidence affects 
a substantial right of the aggrieved party. In determining 
whether a substantial right of the appellanjt has been affected by 
the exclusion of evidence of Trapp's post-cpllision conduct, this 
court should consider the whole record. Th|is court should not 
find an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court unless 
this court, after reviewing the whole record, is left with a 
definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred in its 
ruling. Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc. v. Stepanfiff, 650 P.2d 375 
(Alaska 1982). The test for determining whether the alleged error 
on the part of the trial court is prejudicial to the appellant is 
whether, upon a review of the record, it sufficiently appears that 
the rights of the appellant have been injuriously affected by the 
error, or that he has suffered a miscarriage of justice. See 5 
Am.Jur.2d Appeal & Error §783 (1962). 
In Gull Laboratories, Inc. v. Lewis A. Roser Co., 589 
P.2d 756, 759 (Utah 1978), this court established that "a jury 
verdict will only be upset where the error committed was so 
substantial and prejudicial that there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the result would have been different in the absence of such 
error.'1 Although appellant asserts that the exclusion of evidence 
of Trapp's post-collision conduct affected his substantial rights, 
the better-reasoned authorities find that the exclusion of evi-
dence with only slight or conjectural value does not constitute 
reversible error. See 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal & Error §802 (1962). 
As previously stated herein, the evidence of Trapp's 
post-collision conduct supported only conjectural inferences of 
negligence. Such inferences have little, if any, probative value. 
See Pearce v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489 (Utah 1985); and Dolan v. 
Mitchell, 179 Colo. 359, 502 P.2d 72 (Colo. 1972). Since the 
excluded evidence in the instant case had such little probative 
value, it is impossible to conclude that there is "a reasonable 
likelihood that the result would have been different" had such 
evidence been admitted at trial. Absent such a showing, this 
court should hold that the trial court's ruling did not result in 
a miscarriage of justice or the denial of any substantial right of 
the appellant. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court was justified in (excluding the evidence 
of Trapp's post-accident conduct and propejrly denied Fisher's 
motion for a new trial. The Court of Appeals was correct in its 
decision upholding the lower court's ruling and refusing to 
overturn the jury verdict and judgment entered thereon. This 
court should deny the petition for certiorari. 
Respectfully submitted. 
Dated this £H- day of March, 1^88. 
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APPENDIX A 
RULE 103 
RULINGS ON EVIDENCE 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be pre-
dicated upon a ruling which admits or exclilides evidence unless a 
substantial right of party is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one 
admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to 
strike appears of record, stating the specific 
ground of objection, if the Specific ground was not 
apparent from the context; of 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one 
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence 
was made known to the court by offer or was 
apparent from the context within which questions 
were asked. 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any 
other or further statement which shows the character of the evi-
dence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made, and 
the ruling thereon. It may direct the makijng of an offer in 
question and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury ca^ 
be conducted, to the extent practicable, sq 
es, proceedings shall 
as to prevent inad-
missible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, 
such as making statements or offers of prooj 
in the hearing of the jury 
f or asking questions 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this 
notice of plain errors affecting substantia 
were not brought to the attention of the 
rule precludes taking 
ll rights although they 
court. 
RULE 401 
DEFINITION OF "RELEVANT EVIpENCE" 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency 
to make the existence of any fact that is ojf consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or lc 
it would be without the evidence. 
_ess probable than 
Al 
RULE 402 
RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY 
ADMISSIBLE: IRRELEVANT 
EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 
provided by the Constitution of the United States or the 
Constitution of the State of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or 
by other rules applicable in courts of this State. Evidence 
which is not relevant is not admissible. 
RULE 403 
EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT 
EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE 
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presen-
tation of cumulative evidence. 
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